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  Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to be 
here today to set forth my views on whether FDA regulation of drugs and medical 
devices should bar state liability claims.  This is a subject I have thought about a 
great deal.  I am a Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center and also 
serve as a Scholar with the Center for Progressive Reform.  I have written 
extensively on regulatory preemption, with an emphasis on the question the 
Committee examines today.1   
  My views are these:  FDA’s new position on preemption — namely, that FDA 
regulation of drugs and certain medical devices broadly displaces state liability law 
— is wrong as a legal matter.  I will discuss in some detail the basis for my 
conclusion.  I also want to emphasize why FDA’s position is wrong as a matter of 
public policy, since the ultimate decision about preemption is for Congress, not the 
courts, to make.  Here’s the bottom line: If accepted by the courts and not overturned 
                                                          
1 Submitted along with this testimony are copies of a recent law review article I co-
authored with David A. Kessler, M.D., former Commissioner of the Food and Drug 
Administration, entitled A Critical Examination of the FDA’s Efforts to Preempt 
Failure-to-Warn Claims, 96 Geo. L.J. 461 (2008), a law review article I wrote a few 
years ago that focused on medical device preemption, Preemption and Regulatory 
Failure, 33 Pepp. L. Rev. 95 (2005), and a White Paper I prepared jointly with other 
scholars with the Center for Progressive Reform entitled The Truth About Torts: 
Using Agency Preemption to Undercut Consumer Health and Safety (CPR White 
Paper # 704, July 2007).  I would also refer the Committee to testimony I submitted 
to the Senate Judiciary Committee for a hearing entitled “Regulatory Preemption: 
Are Federal Agencies Usurping Congressional and State Authority,” on September 
12, 2007.  My recent writings on preemption also include a book chapter entitled 
Preemption and Regulatory Failure Risks, which will be published in PREEMPTION 
CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM’S CORE QUESTION (William 
Buzbee, ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2008) (forthcoming) and an essay entitled The 
FDA and Deference Lost: A Self-Inflicted Wound of the Product of a Wounded 
Agency?  93 Cornell L. R. __ (2008) (forthcoming), both of which will be published this 
summer.     
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by Congress, FDA’s pro-preemption position gives consumers the worst of both 
worlds.  On one hand, despite FDA’s claims otherwise, FDA cannot single-handedly 
accomplish the Herculean job of assuring the safety of the 11,000 drugs and 
thousands of medical devices on the market.  Thus, consumers cannot depend on 
FDA regulation alone to protect them from unsafe or defective drugs and medical 
devices.  That is why, until recently, FDA saw the discipline the liability system 
places on the market as an essential complement to its work. 
  Despite FDA’s inability to safeguard the marketplace by itself, FDA claims 
that consumers injured by unsafe drugs or defective medical devices should be 
denied the ability to seek compensation for injuries they sustained through no fault 
of their own.  That is a right that the liability system has guaranteed to the 
American people since the founding of the Republic.   Let’s be clear about this: Under 
FDA’s view, consumers are forced to assume the risks of unsafe drugs and medical 
devices.  At the same time, manufacturers of drugs and medical devices who fail to 
take reasonable steps to assure their drug or device is safe are immunized from 
liability, and, these days, essentially immune from FDA enforcement.  This result is 
not only unfair, it is bad policy.  Removing economic incentives for drug and device 
manufacturers to act responsibly serves no legitimate end, but instead jeopardizes 
the health and well-being of the public.   
  What makes this result all the more indefensible is that the decision to wipe 
away state liability law was not made by Congress through legitimate, democratic 
means.  Instead, it was made by unelected and unaccountable agency officials — 
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many of whom worked for drug and device companies before their government 
service and have returned or will return via the revolving door to represent the same 
companies.2  These decisions were not made in a transparent, publicly accountable 
way.  Rather, they were made in obscure regulatory documents, with no opportunity 
for public input, and with no regard for the clear-cut requirements of Executive 
Order 13,132, which disfavors preemption and requires agencies to consult with 
states, local governments and the public before making preemption decisions.3  
  Because the question posed by the Committee relates to both drugs and 
medical devices, and I will address those questions separately.  First, I will address 
medical device preemption and urge Congress to act swiftly to overrule the Supreme 
Court’s recent ruling in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.4  Here, I start with a brief history 
of the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 and explain why that history 
demonstrates that Congress quite clearly intended to preserve state liability law.  I 
2 See, e.g., Anne C. Mulkern, Watchdogs or Lapdogs?  When Advocates Become 
Regulators, The Denver Post, May 23, 2004.   
3 Executive Order 13,132 provides that “[w]hen an agency foresees the possibility of a 
conflict between State law and Federally protected interests within its area of 
regulatory responsibility, the agency shall consult, to the extent practicable, with 
appropriate State and local officials in an effort to avoid such a conflict.”  Id. §(4)(d).   
The Order also directs agencies to construe federal law to preempt State law “only 
where the statute contains an express preemption provision or there is some other 
clear evidence that Congress intended the preemption of State law, or where the 
exercise of State authority conflicts with the exercise of Federal authority under the 
Federal statute.”  Id. §(4)(d).  The Executive Order is available at 64 Fed. Reg. 
43,255, 43,257 (Aug. 10, 1999).  FDA has simply ignored these requirements in 
accomplishing its about-face on preemption.   
4 Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008).   
 -4-
will then turn to the Court’s ruling in Riegel and address why the Court’s wooden 
textual approach to the Amendments — which ignored their purpose — led the 
Court to conclude, wrongly, that Congress intended the Amendments to preempt 
state liability claims for devices approved by FDA through the pre-market approval 
process.    
  I will then turn to a discussion of the debate that is raging in the courts over 
FDA’s new contention that its approval of a drug’s labeling broadly preempts state 
liability claims.  The lower courts are deeply divided on drug preemption, although 
the majority of courts have rejected FDA’s pro-preemption position.  This question 
will be considered by the Supreme Court in October in Wyeth v. Levine, and a 
decision can be expected by early 2009.   
  In my view, the question in Wyeth is not a close one.  The federal government 
has regulated the sale of drugs for one hundred years without any hint that state 
liability actions interfered with FDA’s ability to do its job.  Nothing in the statutes 
FDA administers suggests that they oust state liability actions for drug products.  
Indeed, FDA has long taken the view that state liability litigation for 
pharmaceuticals is an important, independent discipline on the market.  And 
Congress has not acted to preempt or limit state liability actions, even though 
Congress has long been aware of the steady procession of liability actions against 
drug makers — including those that pre-date FDA and its forerunners.  For these 
and other reasons I address later in my testimony, I remain hopeful that the Court 
will find that Ms. Levine’s claim is not preempted.   Should the Court reach the 
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wrong conclusion, however, Congress should be ready to respond with legislation to  
restore the right of individuals harmed by dangerous drugs to bring state liability 
actions for redress.   
  I.  FDA Preemption and Medical Devices.   
  Preemption cases involve more than dry and arcane questions of law.  They 
invariably involve a story like Joshua Oukrop’s — a tragic death or serious injury to 
someone caused by a product that failed them.   Joshua Oukrop, a college student, 
was on a spring break trip to Moab, Utah, with his girlfriend.  They went for a bike 
ride, but Joshua soon complained of fatigue, fell to the ground, and died of cardiac 
arrest.  Why?  Joshua had a common genetic disorder that causes erratic heartbeats 
that, if untreated, can trigger sudden cardiac arrest.  But Joshua was able to lead a 
normal life because of a small, pocket-watch-sized, defibrillator that had been 
implanted in his chest.  The defibrillator — a Guidant Prizm 2 — was programmed 
to deliver an electrical impulse to Joshua’s heart when it went into arrest and jolt his 
heart back into a normal rhythm.  But on that day in March 2005, instead of 
delivering a life-saving charge to his heart, Joshua’s defibrillator short-circuited and 
failed.  A wire in the device was too close to a component, causing an arc between 
them when the device fired.5
5  David C. Vladeck, Preemption and Regulatory Failure, 33 Pepp. L. Rev. 95 (2005); 
Thomas McGarity, The Preemption War  (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press 2008) 
(forthcoming); Barry Meier, Maker of Heart Device Kept Flaw From Doctors, N.Y. 
Times (May 24, 2005) at A1; Barry Meier, Repeated Defect in Heart Device Exposes 
a History of Problems, N.Y. Times (Oct. 20, 2005) at A1. 
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  Joshua’s doctors determined that the defibrillator’s malfunction caused his 
death.  This was no surprise to Guidant.  By the time Joshua died, Guidant had 
received 25 reports of other failures of the device for exactly the same reason.  
Guidant had fixed the problem in 2002, three years before Joshua’s death, but 
decided to sell its existing inventory, without first fixing the flaw.  After all, 
defibrillators cost $25,000.  Thousands of these faulty defibrillators were sold after 
Guidant had developed a new and safer device.  Nor did Guidant tell physicians or 
patients about the defect.  Word of the defect might frighten patients into opting for 
potentially risky surgery to replace the device.  And in Guidant’s view, its data still 
showed the Prizm 2 to be “a highly reliable life-saving product.”6
  Shortly after his death, Joshua’s doctors met with Guidant officials to discuss 
what the company would do for the 24,000 patients who depended on the same 
device.  Guidant offered to replace the devices Joshua’s doctors had implanted in 
their patients.  But Guidant was unwilling to inform other doctors, fearing that they 
too might want replacement devices.  Guidant’s efforts to keep the defect quiet did 
not succeed.  The media disclosed that the short-circuiting problem had affected 
other Guidant defibrillators, and that Guidant had concealed the defect.  Ultimately, 
three years after learning of the defect, after dozens of failures (including at least 
one other death and several heart attacks), and prodding from FDA, Guidant decided 
to “recall” the Prizm 2, as well as several other defibrillator models, affecting more 
6  See, e.g., Barry Meier, Maker of Heath Device Kept Flaw From Doctors, N.Y. 
Times (May 24, 2005) A1; The Preemption War, at 135. 
 -7-
                                                          
than 50,000 patients.7  As I’ll explain in a minute, the Supreme Court’s recent ruling 
in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., will immunize companies like Guidant from liability for 
conduct such as this, notwithstanding the grave harm that it inflicted on Joshua and 
his family.   
  The statute that governs medical devices — the Medical Device Amendments 
of 1976 (MDA) — was enacted in response to a series of highly-publicized public 
health catastrophes caused by defective medical devices, like the Guidant 
defibrillator.  Most notorious was the Dalkon Shield.  It was an intrauterine device 
introduced and widely marketed by the A.H. Robins Company without FDA 
approval.  At the time, FDA had limited authority over medical devices.  In 
producing the device, Robins ignored its own experts, who urged that both ends of 
the device’s “sheath” be sealed to prevent “wicking” of bacteria-laden fluids into the 
uterus.  Robins touted the Dalkon Shield as a safe and effective alternative to birth 
control pills.  Soon after it hit the market, however, women began contracting 
infections that caused death, infertility, and other serious injuries.  Robins kept the 
device on the market for an additional year, but finally stopped selling it in 1974.  
7 “Recalling” a medical device implanted into a patient’s body presents its own 
complications.  For many cardiac patients, the risk of additional surgery to explant a 
defective defibrillator, pacemaker or heart valve outweighs the risk of retaining a 
defective product.  See, e.g., Barry Meier, Maker of Heath Device Kept Flaw From 
Doctors, N.Y. Times (May 24, 2005) A1.  Many patients decide not to undergo 
replacement surgery, but then endure the risk of life-threatening product failure.  A 
young and otherwise healthy patient like Joshua likely would have opted for 
replacement surgery.  See generally Barry Meier, Faulty Heart Devices Force Some 
Scary Decisions, N.Y. Times (June 20, 2005) A1.  
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Litigation by thousands of injured women brought to light the nature and severity of 
the problem and afforded women the only compensation that was available to them.8
  To avoid a recurrence of this and similar tragedies, Congress enacted the 
MDA to give FDA regulatory authority over all medical devices.9  The MDA reserves 
the most rigorous regulation for “Class III” devices — devices, like defibrillators, 
heart valves, and pacemakers, that sustain life or pose a serious risk to patients if 
they malfunction.  As a general rule, before marketing a Class III device, a 
manufacturer must submit a pre-market approval (PMA) application asking FDA’s 
permission to market the device for the specific uses identified in the application.  
There are two exceptions.  First, any device manufactured prior to the passage of the 
MDA — a “grandfathered” device — is not subject to the PMA requirements.  
Second, a device manufactured after 1976 may bypass the PMA process if the 
manufacturer can show that it is “substantially equivalent” to a grandfathered 
device.  Before granting a PMA, FDA must find that there is a “reasonable 
assurance” that the device is safe and effective for its intended use.  
8  Morton Mintz, At Any Cost: Corporate Greed, Women, and the Dalkon Shield (New 
York: Pantheon Press 1985); Richard B. Sobol, Bending the Law: The Story of the 
Dalkon Shield Bankruptcy (Chicago, Ill.: U. Chi. Press 1991).  
9  The term “medical device” includes an array of products, from cotton swabs to 
artificial heart valves.  See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 476 (1996).  
Medical devices are categorized into three classes, based on the potential risk of 
harm posed.  Class I devices, like swabs, are subject only to general controls that 
provide a reasonable assurance of safety.  Id. at 477.  Class II devices, such as 
hearing aids, are subject to somewhat stricter controls, to ensure that they are both 
safe and effective for their intended use.  Id.  Class III devices are used to sustain 
human life or pose a serious risk to patients.  Id. at 477-78.  
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  Because FDA lacked authority over medical devices before 1976, states had 
filled the regulatory void.  By the time the MDA was enacted, a number of states, 
especially California, were engaging in robust regulation of devices.  Accordingly, to 
formalize the allocation of responsibilities between FDA and state regulators, 
Congress included an express preemption provision in the MDA.  It provides that “no 
State . . . may establish or continue in effect with respect to a device intended for 
human use any requirement (1) which is different from, or in addition to, any 
requirement applicable under this chapter to the device, and (2) which relates to the 
safety or effectiveness of the device . . ..”10  This language is important.  Nothing in it 
says that Congress is acting to nullify existing state damages claims.  There are 
federal statutes that do just that.  But they do so in unmistakable terms and 
generally provide a federal remedy in lieu of displaced state remedies.11
10  21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (emphasis added).  In an earlier ruling finding that the MDA 
did not preempt liability actions for devices not subject to full-scale FDA premarket 
approval, the Court had observed that the MDA’s preemption provision “was 
primarily concerned with the problem of specific, conflicting state statutes and 
regulations rather than the general duties enforced by common-law actions.”  See 
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 489 (1996).     
11  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2210 et seq. (Price-Anderson Act, which federalizes all 
claims for personal and property damage arising from significant accidents at 
civilian nuclear power plants); 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1et seq. (Vaccine Act, which 
federalizes all claims arising from personal injuries relating to the administration of 
vaccines); Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act of 2001, Pub. L. 
No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230 (2001) (9/11 Compensation Fund, which substitutes a 
federal remedy for tort claims 9/11 victims and their families could have asserted 
against the airlines whose planes were hijacked); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. 
(Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, which federalizes disputes over 
employment related benefits). 
   Nor was there any indication that Congress, which enacted the MDA in 
response to tragedies like the Dalkon Shield — brought to light because of liability 
litigation — wanted to deprive persons injured by defective devices the 
compensation they could obtain only through liability actions.  And, for most of the 
MDA’s history, FDA took the position that the MDA did not preempt state liability 
actions.12
 All of that changed in 2002 when the agency made a 180-degree shift in 
position.  Abandoning its decades-old stance, FDA aggressively sought to 
participate in private state liability cases on behalf of device manufacturers to 
argue that the MDA’s preemption provision immunized device manufacturers 
from liability under state law.  Without informing the public, states or local 
governments, or seeking their views on its new position, FDA filed amicus briefs 
in several cases — always on the side of the manufacturer, never on the side of the 
injured patient — urging the courts to find the injured patient’s claim preempted.   
As a result of FDA’s reversal of field, lower courts began adopting FDA’s new 
position, which created a split of authority among lower courts.  To resolve the 
question, the Supreme Court granted review in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.   
                                                          
12 See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Smith Indus. Med. Sys. 
v. Kernats (No. 96-1405) (arguing on behalf of FDA that the MDA preemption 
provision was narrow and did not preempt state liability cases).   
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 On February 20, 2008, the Court ruled that the MDA expressly preempts 
state liability actions for PMA devices.13  The majority opinion does not address 
the purpose of the MDA, let alone suggest that preemption is right as a policy 
matter.  Instead, the majority relied on the word “requirement,” which, the Court 
held, is a term of art that may, and in the MDA does, encompass state liability 
actions.14   The majority reasoned that because state liability actions seek to 
impose “requirements” on device manufacturers “different from, or in addition to,” 
those imposed by FDA, they are preempted under a literal reading of the MDA.  In 
the majority’s view, Congress’ selection of the word “requirement” demonstrates 
that Congress made the choice to preempt state law.15   
 As a result of Riegel, thousands of cases like the one that Joshua Oukrup’s 
family brought against Guidant and settled will no longer be viable.  FDA’s 
premarket approval of a device would, standing alone, require dismissal of the 
case, even if the device proves to be unsafe, and even if the device’s label fails to 
provide physicians and patients with adequate information to assess the device’s 
                                                          
13 The Court’s ruling in Riegel applies only to PMA devices.  As noted, the Court 
had previously ruled in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996), that state 
liability actions involving non-PMA devices approved by FDA were not preempted.   
14 Riegel, 129 S.Ct. at 1007-10. 
15 Justice Stevens filed a concurring opinion, in which he acknowledges that the 
majority’s decision is in tension with Congress’ intent in the MDA, but he 
nonetheless concurred in the majority’s focus on the word “requirement” and its 
conclusion that Congress’ use of that word expressed Congress’ intend to preempt.  
Id. at 1011-12.  Justice Ginsburg filed a dissent, arguing that the majority’s 
opinion “effect[s] a radical curtailment of state common-law suits seeking 
compensation for injuries caused by defectively designed or labeled medical 
devices” — a result that Congress did not intend.  Id. at 1013. 
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risks.  The one exception noted by the Riegel Court is where the manufacturer 
violated duties imposed by FDA.  In those instances, the Riegel ruling would “not 
prevent a State from providing a damages remedy for claims premised on a 
violation of FDA regulations; the state duties in such a case ‘parallel,’ rather than 
add to, federal requirements.”16
  Riegel deals a body blow to injured consumers and their families.  The 
device industry tries to minimize Riegel’s impact by making two points.  One is 
that Riegel applies only to PMA devices, which comprise a very small fraction of 
the devices on the market.  The second is that Riegel does not preclude actions 
based on the manufacturer’s breach of federal duties.   
  To be fair, both of these points are correct.  But they overlook the real-life 
consequences of the decision.  Make no mistake, the impact of Riegel on 
consumers will be severe and far-reaching.  The devices specifically approved by 
FDA are generally the ones that sustain or support life, and failure of those 
devices all too often leads to dire, and at times, fatal consequences.  Thus, the fact 
that FDA also permits other, non-PMA devices on the market is beside the point.  
The devices that matter most are PMA devices.  Nor is the remote prospect that 
someone injured by a PMA device might have a claim based on a violation of a 
federal requirement much comfort.  In most cases, a finding of preemption with 
respect to life-saving or life-sustaining PMA devices simultaneously immunizes 
manufacturers for their errors, removes incentives to prevent or correct errors, 
                                                          
16  Riegel, 129 S.Ct. at 1011. 
 -12-
and deprives consumers injured through no fault of their own of compensation 
that historically has been available under state law.  None of these consequences 
is defensible as a matter of public policy. 
  Let me make one last point about medical devices.  FDA has had to strain 
to suggest that its approval of a device is a warrant for its safety.  In fact, 
premarket approval is a one-time licensing decision based on whether the device’s 
sponsor has shown a “reasonable assurance” of safety — a standard far less 
rigorous than for drugs, which must be shown to be safe and effective for their 
intended use.  Unlike drugs, which are extensively tested, medical devices are 
often approved on the basis of a single clinical trial, in part because of the ethical 
problems in testing experimental medical devices on human subjects.  Once on the 
market, FDA engages in only limited surveillance.  There is no provision in the 
MDA for devices to be periodically re-certified by FDA.  As a result, defective 
devices typically remain on the market until the manufacturer commences a 
“voluntary” recall, often in response to adverse publicly generated by state liability 
litigation.      
  FDA’s track record demonstrates the agency’s inability to single-handedly 
protect the American people against defective and dangerous medical devices.  
Just in the past few years, we have seen massive recalls of defibrillators,17 
                                                          
17 Consider the case of the Guidant defibrillators, discussed in my Pepperdine 
article.  By the time they were withdrawn from the market, more than 24,000 of 
the defective devices had been implanted in patients, who then faced the daunting 
decision of whether to have replacement surgery.  See generally In Re Guidant 
Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prod. Liab. Litig., 2007 WL 1725289 (D. Minn. 
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pacemakers,18 heart valves,19 and heart pumps20 — which have exacted a terrible 
toll on the patients who have had them implanted in their bodies, and who often 
face the daunting prospect of explantation and replacement surgery.  Post-Riegel, 
these patients will now be left with no remedy at all: no compensation for the pain 
and suffering they endure, no reimbursement for the expenses of surgery and a 
replacement device, and no recompense to their loved-ones should they die as a 
result of a defective device.  Making matters worse, manufacturers will have little 
economic incentive to recall swiftly defective devices, since they are immunized 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
June 12, 2007); Barry Meier, FDA Expanding Inquiry into Heart-Device 
Company, N.Y. Times (Aug. 25, 2005), at C3.  
18 Although Medtronic’s 4004M pacemaker was approved by FDA, it was later 
determined to be defectively designed.  Some patients died when the pacemaker’s 
defective lead failed; many patients were forced to undergo open-heart surgery to 
replace the defective lead.  Prior to Riegel, the courts were split on whether the 
plaintiffs’ claims were preempted.  Compare Cupek v. Medtronic, Inc., 405 F.3d 
421 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding claims preempted) with Goodlin v. Medtronic, Inc., 167 
F.3d 1367 (11th Cir. 1999) (finding no preemption).   
19 The St. Jude Silzone heart valve is another instructive case.  This valve was 
approved on the basis of only scanty testing involving 20 human subjects.  After 
St. Jude starting selling the valve, testing revealed that its silver coating not only 
did not protect against infection, but it also caused the valves to leak.  Litigation 
publicized the risk and forced St. Jude to recall the problem valves, but not until 
they had been implanted in over 36,000 patients.  See generally In re St. Jude, 
Inc. Silzone Heart Valves Prod. Liab. Litig., 2004 WL 45503 (D. Minn. Jan. 5, 
2004); see also Bowling v. Pfizer, 143 F.R.D. 141 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (class action 
involving 55,000 patient implanted with different defective heart valve).   
20 See Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding claim against 
manufacturer of device heart pump preempted, even though evidence showed that 
it was defectively designed and that the pump had been redesigned to correct 
design defect).   
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from liability in tort, and virtually certain to face no enforcement sanction from 
FDA, which has essentially withdrawn the regulatory cop from the beat.21   
  Premarket approval is an important process intended to put an end to the 
marketing of devices without meaningful testing and with no assurance of safety.  
But PMA process, by itself, cannot replace the continuous and comprehensive 
safety incentives, information disclosure, and victim compensation that state 
liability law has traditionally provided.   
   The Court’s opinion in Riegel makes it clear that the decision about  
preemption is one for Congress.  The ball is squarely in Congress’ court.  I would 
urge Congress to act swiftly to restore the historic availability of state liability law 
protections both to ensure that compensation is available to people injured 
through no fault of their own and to place economic incentives on device 
manufacturers to take reasonable measures to protect consumers from defective or 
unsafe devices.22    
                                                          
21 The decline in enforcement activities by FDA is nothing short of stunning.  In 
1991 through 1993, the agency brought a total of 468 civil seizure actions, 75 
injunction cases, and 121 criminal prosecutions.  See Peter Barton Hutt, The State 
of Science at the Food and Drug Administration, in FDA SCIENCE AND MISSION AT 
RISK: REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY app. B, B-22-23 
(2007).  However, from 2004 to 2007, the agency brought a total of only 53 civil 
seizure actions, 57 injunction cases, and no criminal prosecutions.  Id.  The decline 
in FDA warning letters is just as steep: from 1,788 in 1993 to only 467 in 2007.  Id.   
22 Overturning the result in Riegel will require Congress to amend the MDA to 
make clear that the preemption provision, 21 U.S.C. 360k(a), does not preempt 
state liability action.  One approach would be to define the word “requirement” to 
mean only positive state law (i.e., statutes and regulations); another would be to 
insert a “savings clause” to make explicit that nothing in the provision should be 
construed to displace state liability law.    
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  II.  FDA Preemption and Drugs. 
  As noted above, FDA’s reversal of field on device preemption was part of a 
broad realignment by FDA on preemption more generally.  Pushed by the agency’s 
political, non-career appointees, FDA now asserts that virtually every one of its 
regulatory actions — from setting standards for sun-screen products to the 
labeling of over-the-counter drugs — preempts state law.23  
  The most important and inexplicable of these shifts was FDA’s about-face 
on the agency’s long-expressed position that its regulation of drug labeling does 
not immunize drug manufacturers from failure-to-warn claims.  FDA’s prior 
position was not surprising.  The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act does not 
contain, and never has contained, a preemption provision for drug products.  
Indeed, when the 1938 Act was being debated, Congress was told that the bill did 
not need to create a federal claim for damages because state law already 
permitted such actions to be brought.24  And the Act has been amended repeatedly 
since then, but Congress has never given the pharmaceutical industry the 
immunity from liability it has long coveted.  Indeed, the one preemption provision 
in the Act applicable to drugs cuts decidedly against FDA’s position.  When 
Congress added the efficacy requirements to the Act in 1962, it added a provision 
                                                          
23 See FDA, Sunscreen Drug Products for Over-the-Counter Human Use, Proposed 
Amendment of Final Monograph; Proposed Rule, 72 Fed. Reg.49070, 47109-10 
(Aug. 27, 2007); FDA, Over-the-Counter Human Drugs; Labeling Requirements; 
Proposed Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. 74474, 74481 (Dec. 12, 2006).     
24 See Hearings on S. 1944 before a Subcomm. of the Sen. Comm. on Commerce, 
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 400 (1933) (statement of W. A. Hines).   
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that states: “Nothing in the amendments . . . shall be construed as invaliding any 
provision of State law which would be valid in the absence of such amendments 
unless there is a direct and positive conflict between such amendments and such 
provision of State law.”25    
  Nonetheless, FDA now maintains that state failure-to-warn litigation 
threatens its ability to protect the public health.  A determination in civil 
litigation that an FDA-approved label fails adequately to warn of risks may force 
manufacturers to add warnings not approved by FDA, or even warnings that FDA 
considered and rejected.  For that reason, FDA asserts that most failure-to-warn 
litigation is preempted.26  As noted, FDA’s change of position has triggered a 
substantial wave of preemption litigation over drug claims, with the vast majority 
of courts rejecting FDA’s pro-preemption position.27  The Supreme Court will 
address this issue in October 2008 when it reviewsWyeth v. Levine.   
  This seismic shift in policy must be viewed against the backdrop of the 
agency’s long-held, and repeatedly expressed, position to the contrary.  Let’s be 
clear about one thing: Litigation against drug manufacturers for failing to warn 
physicians and patients about the risks that attend the drug is nothing new.  
                                                          
25 See 76 Stat. 780, 793 (1962).    
26 See FDA, Final Rule, Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for 
Human Prescription Drugs and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934 (Jan. 
24, 2006).   
27 See also Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 199 S. Ct. at 1019 & n.16 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (noting that “[c]ourts that have considered the question have 
overwhelmingly held that FDA approval of a new drug application does not 
preempt state tort suits,” and citing cases so holding). 
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Perhaps the most celebrated failure-to-warn case — Thomas v. Winchester — was 
decided by the New York State Court of Appeals in 1852.28   Since Thomas, there 
has been a steady stream of failure-to-warn litigation against drug companies, 
both pre- and post-dating the creation of the modern FDA in 1938, and its 
forerunner in 1908.29  Notwithstanding FDA’s awareness of this litigation, until 
recently, FDA steadfastly took the position that its regulation of drug labeling did 
not preempt state failure-to-warn litigation.30  Indeed, FDA took exactly the 
                                                          
28 6 N.Y. 397 (1852).  In Thomas, the court held that, even though the consumer 
purchased the mis-labeled drug from a pharmacist, the consumer could sue the 
manufacturer of the drug which was responsible for the mislabeling.   
29 These cases are legion, but a sample includes: Blood Balm v. Cooper, 83 Ga. 457, 
10 S.E. 118 (1889); Valmas Drug Co. v. Smoots, 269 F. 356 (6th Cir. 1920) 
(applying Michigan law); Hruska v. Parke, Davis & Co., 6 F.2d 536 (8th Cir. 1925) 
(applying Missouri law); Halloran v. Parke, Davis & Co., 245 A.D. 727, 280 N.Y.S. 
58 (N.Y. App. Div. 1935); Wechsler v. Hoffman-La Roche, 198 Misc. 540, 99 
N.Y.S.2d 588 (N.Y. App. Div. 1950); Wright v. Carter Products, 244 F.2d 53 (2d 
Cir. 1957) (applying Massachusetts law).  By 1964, the pace of drug litigation had 
accelerated to the point that one commentator called the 1960s “the era of the 
drug” and observed that “drugs are being withdrawn from the market in 
unprecedented numbers because of undesirable side effects which are deemed to 
outweigh whatever therapeutic value the drugs may have.”  Paul Rheingold, 
Products Liability – The Ethical Drug Manufacturers’ Liability, 18 Rutgers L. 
Rev. 947 (1964).  The reasons for this growth in litigation were (1) the fact that 
states had abandoned defenses based on lack of privity; and (2) the 1962 
amendments to the FDCA required manufacturers to show that the drug was not 
just safe, but was also effective for its intended use.  Post-1960, representative 
cases include: Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories , 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. 
Rptr. 320 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1960); Sterling Drug v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 
1966) (applying Missouri law); Love v. Wolf, 226 Cal. App. 2d 379, 38 Cal. Rptr. 
183 (Cal. Ct. App. 1964); Lake v. Konstantinu, 189 So. 2d 171 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1966).  See also Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 199 S. Ct. at 1017 n.11 (canvassing state 
law drug liability cases).   
30 See, e.g. FDA, Final Rule: Labeling and Prescription Drug Advertising: Content 
and Format for Labeling for Human Prescription Drugs, 44 Fed. Reg. 37434, 
37447 (June 26, 1979) (making clear that FDA regulation for labeling “do not 
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opposite position, emphasizing that it did “not believe that the evolution of state 
tort law will cause the development of standards that would be at odds with the 
agency’s [drug labeling] regulations.”31  Thus, FDA’s current argument that state 
liability actions — which turn on claims that the manufacturer withheld 
important safety information from physicians and patients — impair FDA’s ability 
to protect the public health deserve especially close scrutiny.    
  In an article recently published in the Georgetown Law Journal, former 
FDA Commissioner David A. Kessler, M.D., and I make three key points why, in 
our view, FDA’s position on drug preemption cannot be sustained.  
  1.  Failure-to-warn litigation does not challenge FDA’s decision to approve a 
label for a new drug, or even the agency’s final say over the form and contents of 
drug labeling.  Instead, failure-to-warn litigation challenges the company’s failure 
to revise its labeling to warn physicians and patients about risks unknown at the 
time of approval, or risks that turn out to be graver than the company and FDA 
originally thought.   
                                                                                                                                                                                       
prohibit a manufacturer . . . from warning health care professionals whenever 
possibly harmful adverse effects associated with the use of the drug are 
discovered.  The addition to labeling and advertising of additional warnings . . . is 
not prohibited by these regulations.”); FDA, Prescription Drug Product Labeling; 
Medication Guide Requirement, 63 Fed. Reg. 66378, 66384 (Dec. 1, 1988) (“FDA 
does not believe that the evolution of state tort law will cause the development of 
standards that would be at odds with the agency’s [drug labeling] regulations.  
FDA’s regulations establish the minimal standards necessary, but were not 
intended to preclude the states from imposing additional labeling requirements”); 
see also Margaret Jane Porter, The Lohr Decision: FDA Perspective and Position, 
52 Food & Drug L.J. 7 (1997). 
31 FDA, Prescription Drug Product Labeling; Medication Guide Requirement, 63 
Fed. Reg. 66378, 66384 (Dec. 1, 1988) (emphasis added). 
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  FDA’s own regulations impose a duty on drug manufacturers to modify 
labeling without delay when hazards emerge, and expressly authorize labeling 
changes without the agency’s advance approval.  When FDA approves a new drug, 
it also approves the drug’s proposed labeling.  The manufacturer must follow the 
FDA-approved label and must submit a supplemental new drug application (NDA) 
to FDA if it wishes to change the label.32  Ordinarily, the manufacturer waits for 
FDA approval before making the change.  However, FDA rules create an exception 
in cases where a manufacturer makes a labeling change “[t]o add or strengthen a 
contraindication, warning precaution, or adverse reaction,” or “[t]o add or 
strengthen an instruction about dosage and administration that is intended to 
increase the safe use of the drug product.”33  In those cases, manufacturers may 
                                                          
32 It is important not to overstate FDA’s authority over labeling.  Until the 2007 
amendments, FDA lacked authority to dictate labeling changes to manufacturers.  
As a result, it took FDA over a year to force Merck to place a warning for heart 
attack and stroke on Vioxx, and even then the agency acceded to Merck’s demand 
that the warning be a weak one and not the stronger warning the agency favored.   
See FDA’s Drug Approval Process: Up to the Challenge? Hearings before the S. 
Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor and Pensions, 109th Cong., 23 (2005) (testimony of 
Sandra Kweder, M.D., Deputy Dir., Office of New Drugs, FDA) (explaining that 
Merck “rejected many of our proposals,” and defending the lengthy delay in the 
labeling change by observing that “we don’t have the authority to tell a company, 
this is how your label has to look.”).  To be sure, the FDA Amendments Act of 2007 
makes explicit that FDA has authority to compel labeling changes, but it also 
requires the agency to first negotiate with the company, a process that will likely 
take months, even if the agency accelerates it.  See FDAAA, Tit. IX, sec. 901(a), § 
505(o)(4), 121 Stat. 924-26.   
33 See 21 C.F.R. § 201.80(e) (requiring labels to contain requisite warnings); 21 
C.F.R. § 314.70(b)(2)(v)(A) (setting forth general rule that drug labeling must be 
approved by FDA); Id. § 314.70(c)(6) (setting forth exceptions that permit 
manufacturers to change the label without first obtaining FDA approval).  
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change labeling without first securing FDA’s permission, so long as they file a 
supplemental NDA at the same time they make the labeling change.  
  Thus, the common law duty enforced in failure-to-warn litigation — namely 
a drug company’s duty to take all reasonable measures to alert physicians and 
patients to previously unknown hazards — is no different than the duty FDA itself 
imposes on drug manufacturers.  That is why the steady procession of failure-to-
warn cases has not interfered with FDA’s regulatory efforts for all of these years: 
the duties imposed by state and federal laws are parallel and mutually 
reinforcing.34
                                                          
34 The Vermont Supreme Court’s decision in Levine v. Wyeth, 2006 Vt. 107 (Vt. 
2006), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 1118 (2008), is a good illustration of the utility of 
state law in enforcing broader public policy norms.  Ms. Levine was a musician 
who suffered through two amputations, ultimately losing an arm that ended her 
career, because the anti-nausea drug Phenergan, was administered through the 
“Push IV” method, inadvertently introducing Phenergan directly into her artery.  
TThe corrosive nature of Phenergan can lead to catastrophic tissue damage if it 
enters a patient’s arterial blood flow.  This risk was realized when an error in 
Levine’s IV- Push procedure injected the drug into her arteries and caused her 
injuries.  Wyeth was well aware of this risk.  Yet its labeling did not clearly warn 
physicians or patients.  Wyeth’s defense was that it had submitted proposed 
labeling changes to FDA, which rejected them.  But the Vermont Supreme Court 
found neither proposal sought to change the warning regarding administering the 
drug by intravenous injection, and thus the submissions did not provide Wyeth a 
defense.  Levine,  ¶ 23.  FDA approved Phenergan’s label over twenty-five years 
ago.   Even assuming that Phenergan’s label appropriately balanced the drug’s 
known risks when approved, there is no evidence that FDA revisited its 
assessment of the IV-Push method to verify that the warnings were appropriate in 
light of new adverse-reaction information.  Yet, by 1976, both the agency and 
Wyeth were aware of the risk.  See id.  The jury’s verdict assessed liability for 
Wyeth’s failure to improve the warning as the risk became increasingly clear.  
Because FDA never took definitive action with respect to new information about 
this increased risk of arterial damage, no possible conflict exists between any FDA 
decision and a jury verdict requiring Wyeth to pay damages.  The verdict provides 
incentives for Wyeth to improve its warnings, but it does not require the 
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  There is one more point to make about these FDA regulations, which are 
known as the “change being effected,” or CBE, regulations.  Apparently in 
response to industry pressure, FDA has recently proposed modifications the CBE 
regulations to limit the ability of manufacturers to make changes without first 
securing FDA’s approval to situations in which the change is based on “new” 
information that had not been available previously to the manufacturer.  See 73 
Fed. Reg. 2848 (Jan. 16, 2008).  Not only does this proposal run counter to 
fundamental notions of public health — public health is threatened if 
manufacturers have to wait for an FDA greenlight to warn physicians and 
patients of a serious, undisclosed risk — it is also transparently an effort to fortify 
industry’s position in Wyeth v. Levine.  I would urge this Committee to find out 
whether, as many suspect, this proposal was initiated by industry and not FDA, 
perhaps by demanding all FDA correspondence, emails, and other records 
reflecting communications with individuals outside FDA on this matter. 
 2.  More fundamentally, FDA’s preemption argument presupposes that the 
agency has the resources to perform the monumental task of ensuring that the 
labeling of drugs on the market reflects current safety information.  It does not.   
According to the November 2007 report of a blue-ribbon panel appointed by the 
FDA Commissioner, “[t]he scientific demands on the Agency far exceed its 
capacity to respond.  This imbalance is imposing a significant risk to the integrity 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
manufacturer to do anything that is inconsistent with that which FDA has 
instructed it to do.  
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of the . . . regulatory system, and hence the safety of the public.”35  The Institute 
of Medicine reported in 2006 that FDA “lacks the resources needed to accomplish 
its large and complex mission today, let alone to position itself for an increasingly 
challenging future.”36   These reports are no surprise.  FDA regulates products 
that amount to one-quarter of consumer spending in the United States,37 but it 
has only 9,000 employees nationwide.38  According to the most recent statistics, 
FDA’s Office of New Drugs, which reviews new drug applications, employs over 
1,000 physicians and scientists to review the approximately 100 new drug 
applications each year and to supervise post-marketing studies.  In contrast, 
FDA’s Office of Drug Safety, the unit charged with monitoring adverse events 
associated with the 3,000 prescription drugs (and 11,000 drugs altogether) on the 
market, has about 100 professional employees.39      
                                                          
35 FDA SCIENCE AND MISSION AT RISK: REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE 
AND TECHNOLOGY 1.1 (2007). 
36 INST. OF MED., THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY: PROMOTING AND PROTECTING THE 
HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC 193 (National Academies Press 2006). 
37 FDA News, The Food and Drug Administration Celebrates 100 Years of Service 
to the Nation (Jan. 4, 2006). 
38 Food and Drug Administration, An Overview of the FDA.  In addition to drug 
safety, these employees also review applications to market new medical devices, 
monitor the safety of the medical devices on the market, inspect drug and device 
manufacturing facilities, inspect virtually all of the non-meat food products sold in 
this country (including a rising flood of imported foods), inspect food processing 
and storage facilities, regulate dietary supplements, oversee the safety of the blood 
supply and tissues for transplantation, regulate radiologic and biologic products, 
and regulate veterinary medicines and cosmetics.  Id.    
39 FDA’s Approval Process: Up to the Challenge?, Hearings before the S. Comm. 
on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, 109th Cong., 10 (2005) (Joint 
 -23-
  I recognize that Congress has recently enacted comprehensive amendments 
to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which will bolster the agency’s statutory 
authority and shore-up, to some extent, the agency’s flagging resources.  But as 
Senator Ted Kennedy warned, even with added resources, “[t]he resources of the 
drug industry to collect and analyze . . . safety data vastly exceed the resources of 
the FDA, and no matter what we do, they will always have vastly greater 
resources to monitor the safety of their products than the FDA does.”40
  3.  State liability litigation helps uncover and assess risks that are not 
apparent to the agency during a drug’s approval process, and this “feedback loop” 
enables the agency to better do its job.  FDA approval of drugs is based on clinical 
trials that involve, at most, a few thousand patients and last a year or two.  These 
trials cannot detect risks that are relatively rare, affect vulnerable sub-
populations, or have long latency periods.  For this reason, most serious adverse 
effects do not become evident until a drug is used in larger population groups for 
periods in excess of one year.41  Time and again, failure-to-warn litigation has 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
Statement of Sandra L. Kweder, M.D., Deputy Director, Office of New Drugs, and 
Janet Woodcock, M.D., Acting Deputy Commissioner for Operations, Food and 
Drug Administration, to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor and 
Pensions, U.S. Senate) (March 1 & 3, 2005) (reporting that for fiscal year 2005 the 
Office of Drug Safety had about 90 full time employees, but projecting for fiscal 
year 2006 an increase to about 110 full time employees).  
40 153 CONG. REC. S11,832 (2007) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). 
41 See, e.g., Hearings on Risk and Responsibility: The Roles of the FDA and 
Pharmaceutical Companies in Ensuring Safety of Approved Drugs, Like Vioxx, 
Before the H. Comm. on Government Reform, 109th Cong., 23, 55 (2005) 
(testimony of Steven Galston, Acting Director, Center for Drug Evaluation and 
Research, FDA).   
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brought to light information that would not otherwise be available to FDA, to 
do+ctors, to other health care providers, and to consumers.   And failure-to-warn 
litigation has often preceded and clearly influenced FDA decisions to modify 
labeling, and, at times, to withdraw drugs from the market.42  
  Congress is, of course, acutely aware of the shortcomings in FDA’s ability to 
police the marketplace on drug safety, which have been driven home by the recent 
public health failures involving widely-prescribed drugs like Vioxx, Bextra, 
Baycol, Rezulin, Celebrex, Avandia, and Evra Ortho.  FDA’s current claim that it, 
and it alone, can single-handedly discipline this market is a difficult claim to 
accept.   
 For the Committee’s purposes, however, the key point here is that the 
agency’s claim that it is authorized to direct the preemption of state law is not 
based on any mandate from Congress.  Congress has not dictated preemption with 
respect to drug products, nor has it delegated to FDA the authority to define the 
borderline between federal regulation and state tort law.  Nonetheless, the agency 
claims authority to cut off state law now because, at some point in the future, a 
state court might issue a ruling that undercuts the agency’s regulatory authority.  
With all respect, that is a decision for Congress, not agency officials, to make.  
Congress should stand ready to ensure that its decision not to preempt state 
liability law is respected by both FDA and the courts.  
                                                          
42 See, e.g., Lasser, et al., Timing of New Black Box Warnings and Withdrawals 
for Prescription Medications, 287 J. Am. Med. Ass’n 2215, 2218 (2002); Aaron 
Kesselheim & Jerry Avorn, The Role of Litigation in Defining Drug Risks, 287 J. 
Am. Med. Ass’n 308, 310 (2007) (citing examples).   
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